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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
Vol. XLIII, No. z, December i982 
Descartes on Theological 
Knowledge 
DONALD SIEVERT 
University of Missouri - Columbia 
Arnauld charged Descartes with circularity in his theological proof.' I 
argue that Arnauld was correct. I also make suggestions about why 
Descartes fails to see the circularity. Both points are important. Many 
are uncomfortable with the view that Descartes' system is circular. They 
do not see how Descartes could make such a mistake. I think one should 
not presume either that his system is or is not circular. If, as I do, one 
argues that the system is circular, then I think it is also important to try 
to explain how Descartes could lapse into such an error. 
The theological proofs of the third and fifth meditations appear to be 
quite different. Yet there is a structural similarity between them: both 
aim to establish a correspondence between the idea of God and God 
Himself. Establishing that some of our ideas accurately represent things 
outside the mind is a major point of the Meditations. Establishing such 
correspondence in the theological case is both an instance of this point 
and, as Descartes orders the situation, a prerequisite for establishing it 
in other instances. 
The Philosophical Works of Descartes, ed. and trans. by E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. 
Ross, z vols. (New York: Dover, 195 5), II, 92 and Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. C. Adam 
and P. Tannery, iX vols. (Paris: Cerf, i897-1913), VII, 214. Hereafter I shall refer to 
these works as HR and AT; subsequent references will be to Volume I of HR unless 
otherwise noted by 'II'. 
Arnauld is strikingly blunt when he raises the circularity problem. Gassendi raises 
the same kind of consideration in a more muted way. See HR, II, 152. 
A survey and critical discussion of attempts to rescue Descartes from the charge of 
circularity may be found in T. Attig's "Descartes and Circularity: The Precipitous 
Rush to Defense," The Modern Schoolman, Vol. LIV, No. 4, pp. 368-78. Still more 
recently, J. Van Cleve in "Foundationalism, Epistemic Principles, and the Cartesian 
Circle", The Philosophical Review, Vol. LXXXVIII, No. I, pp. 55-9i and M. Wilson 
in Descartes (London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978) have discussed 
difficulties with the traditional rescue efforts. They have also offered alternatives and 
pointed the discussion in new directions. 
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One of the obstacles to success is Descartes' insistence that one not 
take for granted claims that ideas represent things. Another is Des- 
cartes' frequent contrasting of how things are in his mind with how they 
might be outside the mind. By means of the demon possibility, for 
example, he tells us two things: that he might retain his commitments to 
the existence of a physical world corresponding to some of our simple 
ideas and his commitments to the truths of mathematics; and that he 
might be wrong on both counts. In proving that the idea of God accu- 
rately represents an existing God, Descartes must, if consistent, respond 
to these two features of the demon possibility. 
At least at times, Descartes sees clearly that the way in which he 
draws the idea-thing distinction, and the way in which this distinction 
figures into his doubt, enables one to doubt that the idea of God corre- 
sponds to something outside the mind. He makes this point most 
sharply in the fifth meditation. There he goes so far as to raise the 
objection that a connection among the ideas composing the complex 
idea of God does not determine anything about what the idea purports 
to represent. In the third meditation, Descartes is aware of the point of 
the objection: he aims to prove, and thus not assume, that the idea of 
God is caused by something outside his mind. He also responds to his 
earlier doubt about claims so compelling as mathematical ones by 
introducing the natural light. Descartes believes he meets successfully 
the earlier doubts. I do not. 
The reason he believes his proofs are successful is that in the fifth 
meditation he maintains that doubts associated with the idea-thing dis- 
tinction may be overcome by showing how the essence-existence dis- 
tinction breaks down in the case of God. In the third meditation the use 
of the causal principles may look safe because of the conditional, neu- 
tral character of the principles themselves. Ironically, it is Descartes 
himself, by means of his insistence on the idea-thing distinction and 
attendant doubts (including his insistence on "doubting the indubita- 
ble") who sometimes sees the difficulties with his proofs. Yet he also 
seems oblivious to the difficulties at key junctures. 
I. The Fifth Meditation Proof 
I begin with the fifth meditation discussion because the issues are, I 
believe, clearest there: the proof, the objections, and the responses are 
clear and concise. They are also intermingled. So we need to look at 
several passages at the outset. The gist of the proof is as follows: 
(I) One cannot conceive of God except as existing. That is, exis- 
tence is a necessary component of the conception of God. In 
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still other words: the idea of existence is necessarily con- 
nected with other ideas which, jointly, constitute the idea of 
God. 
(z) Because of (i), we may say that existence is a part of the 
nature of God. 
(3) Thus God necessarily exists. (Cf. HR, i8o-8i; AT, VII, 
65-66.) 
Descartes imagines an objection to this proof: 
But although I cannot really conceive of a God without existence any more than a 
mountain without a valley, still from the fact that I conceive of a mountain with a valley, 
it does not follow that there is such a mountain in the world; similarly although I conceive 
of God as possessing existence, it would seem that it does not follow that there is a God 
which exists; for my thought does not impose any necessity upon things, and just as I may 
imagine a winged horse, although no horse with wings exists, so I would perhaps attribute 
existence to God, although no God existed. (HR, i8i; AT, VII, 66.) 
The views Descartes relies on in defending himself are relevant to the 
proof's success. So it will be helpful to look at what else he says about 
his conceptions and what he says in response to the objection just 
raised. 
About his conceptions, he says: 
I clearly see that existence can no more be separated from the essence of God than 
can its having three angles equal to two right angles be separated from the essence of a 
(rectilinear) triangle, or the idea of a mountain from the idea of a valley; and so there is 
not any less repugnance to our conceiving a God (that is, a Being supremely perfect) to 
whom existence is lacking (that is to say, to whom a certain perfection is lacking), than to 
conceive of a mountain which has no valley. (HR, i8i; AT, VII, 66.) 
About the objection, he says: 
But a sophism is concealed in this objection; for from the fact that I cannot conceive a 
mountain without a valley, it does not follow that there is any mountain or any valley in 
existence, but only that the mountain and the valley, whether they exist or do not exist, 
cannot in any way be separated one from the other. While from the fact that I cannot con- 
ceive God without existence, it follows that existence is inseparable from Him, and hence 
that He really exists; not that my thought can bring this to pass, or impose any necessity 
on things, but, on the contrary, because the necessity which lies in the thing itself, i.e. the 
necessity of the existence of God determines me to think in this way. For it is not within 
my power to think of God without existence . . . though it is in my power to imagine a 
horse either with wings or without wings. (HR, i 8i-8z; AT, VII, 66-67.) 
Descartes makes numerous points in these passages and I shall divide 
those points into two groups, those having to do with our conceptions 
themselves and those having to do with the correspondence of our con- 
ceptions to things outside our minds. 
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Descartes distinguishes between conceptions which can be varied and 
those which cannot be varied. The distinction parallels that between 
ideas which we do and do not assemble, respectively. For Descartes, 
conception is a mental activity which includes drawing an idea from 
what Descartes calls a storehouse of ideas.' In the mountain-valley, tri- 
angle, and God cases the conceptions cannot be varied: the ideas 
involved are so united that one cannot think one part of the complex of 
ideas without at the same time thinking of the other parts.3 One cannot 
draw the idea of God from Descartes' storehouse without thereby draw- 
ing with it the idea of existence. So, too, one cannot draw the idea of a 
mountain without at the same time drawing the idea of a valley. Con- 
nected siamese twins or barbells with the weights permanently attached 
would be appropriate analogues: one cannot have one of the relevant 
parts without having the rest of them. Further, we do not form these 
complexes of ideas. They are permanent residents of our storehouse 
without our having made them. 
Descartes contrasts such invariant ideas with ideas which are variable 
because of our role in making them. For example, we can create the 
idea of a horse with or without wings, with or without a saddle, with or 
without a rider, etc. Habit might lead us to think of such ideas as 
always connected, but both in principle and in practice we could vary 
these ideas. Here the analogue of drawings or models of objects which 
can be varied in accord with the different possibilities in question would 
be appropriate. The contrast between necessarily connected, and 
thereby invariant, complex ideas and variable ideas is central to the fifth 
meditation proof. 
The other important distinction is between those invariant complex 
ideas which include existence and those which do not. Only one invari- 
ant idea includes existence. It is the idea of God. It alone provides us 
with an example of such an idea; no other ideas both include the idea of 
existence and do so necessarily. When I speak of the idea of God as 
special, I shall have in mind its distinctive character of being both invar- 
iant and having existence as one of its components. 
We have seen Descartes provide four examples of complex ideas: the 
idea of a horse (with or without wings), the idea of mountains and val- 
leys, the idea of God, and the idea of a triangle. The idea of a winged 
X Cf. HR, i8z and AT, VII, 67. 
3 Kenny and Russell both seek formulations of this fact about ideas which involve exis- 
tence. For Descartes, the only invariant idea involving existence is that of God. One 
way to express the connection among the different parts of the idea is to say that one 
cannot think of all but one of the parts of the invariant idea without thinking of the 
remaining part. 
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horse is the sole variable idea on the list: the connection between the 
idea of a horse and the idea of wings is contingent (variable). The other 
complex ideas all consist of necessarily connected ideas. Among these, 
only the idea of God includes the idea of existence. Thus when we con- 
ceive of God, but only when we conceive God, we must conceive some- 
thing as necessarily existing. This distinctive feature of the conception 
of God plays an important role when Descartes discusses the corre- 
spondence of our conceptions to things outside ourselves. 
Descartes tells us that from the fact that he cannot conceive a moun- 
tain without a valley (because the relevant ideas are necessarily con- 
nected) "it does not follow that there is such a mountain in the world." 
(HR, i 8 i; AT, VII, 66.) However, what does follow is "that the moun- 
tain and the valley, whether they exist or do not exist, cannot in any 
way be separated from the other." (HR, i8i; AT, VII, 66-67.) Des- 
cartes tells us several things: our conceptions, even our necessary con- 
ceptions, are one thing; there being things which answer to, correspond 
to, fall under, etc., our conceptions is another thing. There are different 
ways in which things can correspond to our conceptions: are there the 
things we conceive (Are there mountains? Valleys?), are they connected 
in the ways our conceptions represent them as being connected (If there 
are mountains and valleys, do they accompany each other)? Descartes 
maintains that our inability to think of mountains without valleys 
leaves open the possibility of whether or not there are mountains or val- 
leys. He also maintains that if there are mountains and valleys they are 
connected as we think they are: mountains always occur with valleys. 
One could put Descartes' view in terms of essential and existential 
truth. On the one hand, there is the generality or essential truth that 
there are no mountains without valleys. We may understand this essen- 
tial truth as the conditional claim that if there are mountains and val- 
leys, then there is no mountain without a valley. In terms of our concep- 
tions we can say that our ideas are so connected that we cannot 
conceive of a mountain without a valley. But the existence outside the 
mind of mountains and valleys, and their being connected as we con- 
ceive them to be, is another matter. Descartes may thus be said to dis- 
tinguish between essential truths and existential truths. 
Essential truths specify necessary connections. They are, in Kant's 
phrase, eternal and unalterable for the reason that the connections on 
which they are based are eternal and unalterable.4 Our knowledge of 
4 For Descartes, the connections among invariant ideas are, like all connections, ulti- 
mately of God's making. God could have made them differently. He tells Arnauld: 
"But I do not think that we should ever say of anything that it cannot be brought about 
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such truths is based solidly and solely on the ways in which we are con- 
strained to think about the world and things in it. Existential truths deal 
with what there is in the world and how the contents of the world are 
arranged. These truths, at least so far as things outside the mind go, are 
not generally determined by the ways we think about the world. These 
distinctions are important in understanding Descartes' response to the 
objection about his theological proof. They enable him to accept the 
objection in a general way without accepting it in the special case of 
God. 
The objection is as follows: although it is true that one must conceive 
something in a certain way, it does not follow that there is an object, 
item, or thing outside the mind which accords with our conception. 
Thus although we cannot conceive God except as existing, it does not 
follow that there is an object, etc., God, which exists. Our conceptions 
are one thing; the existence of things corresponding to them is another 
thing. Descartes accepts the objection in the mountain-valley case but 
not in the God case. Why does he accept the objection in the one case 
but not the other? It will help if we understand how he thinks the objec- 
tion applies to the one case. 
Descartes allows that it is true that we cannot conceive of a moun- 
tain without a valley. He allows also that it does not follow from this 
fact that there are mountains and valleys. I presume that the mountain- 
valley case is offered as prototypical and hence that Descartes believes 
generally that it does not follow from the necessary connections among 
ideas and conceptions that things must exist and exist as we conceive 
them. This point is a recurrent one in the meditations and reflects the 
two components of the demon possibility: the possibility that there may 
be no things corresponding to our ideas (because there are no things at 
all or because they are not arranged in ways paralleling our ideas); the 
possibility that even our most compelling thoughts may be false.5 
Throughout the meditations Descartes is prepared to admit, on the one 
hand, that there are truths which are indubitable in that we cannot 
think their denials. But on the other hand he doubts just such claims, 
sometimes by questioning the correspondence of our conceptions to 
by God. For since everything involved in truth and goodness depends on His omnipo- 
tence, I would not dare to say that God cannot make a mountain without a valley, or 
that one and two should not be three. I merely say that He has given me such a mind 
that I cannot conceive a mountain without a valley, or an aggregate of one and two 
which is not three, and that such things involve a contradiction in my conception." See 
Anthony Kenny, Descartes - Philosophical Letters (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 
pp. 236-37 and AT, V, 223-24. 
5 For helpful elaboration of this issue, see E.B. Allaire, "The Circle of Ideas and the Cir- 
cularity of the Meditations," Dialogue, Vol. II (i966), pp. 131-53. 
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things outside our minds. Indeed, Descartes emphasized in the earlier 
meditations that we ought to proceed as if there are no things which are 
as we conceive them unless and until we have proven otherwise. But in 
the fifth meditation he moves the contrast between essential and exis- 
tential truths to the fore. 
Descartes is prepared to grant the objector that as far as existential 
truths go, one may not draw conclusions on the basis of essential truths. 
Essential truths are known solely by studying ideas. Because of this, one 
is unable to draw conclusions about things outside the mind: given the 
contrast between essential and existential truths, essential truths do not 
determine existential truths. In the mountain-valley, triangle, and horse 
cases, we distinguish the two kinds of truth. And Descartes accepts the 
objection in these cases. But suppose one cannot draw the distinction 
between essential and existential truths across the board. Then, per- 
haps, one may be able to make inferences about how things outside the 
mind are on the basis of how things are conceived. Descartes bets on 
this possibility. 
Recall that the God case is special. Not only is the claim that God 
exists an essential truth but it is a distinctive essential truth in that it 
involves existence. For Descartes, this distinction makes all the differ- 
ence he needs.' According to him, the objection applies in every case 
but that of God. My educated guess is that he believes that the contrast 
between essential and existential truth cannot be drawn in the God 
case. And he believes that because this is so one cannot make the dis- 
tinction between thinking God exists and God's existing. Loosely put, 
one cannot parse off God's existence from His essence. 
Descartes' point is this: where one can distinguish between what 
something is like if it exists and whether that something exists, one may 
distinguish between how we conceive something to be and how it actu- 
ally is. But where existence is part of what something is like, one cannot 
draw that distinction: existing is a very part of what the thing is like and 
hence the thing exists. The pertinent case is, of course, the case of God. 
6 Descartes says at HR, i82 and AT, VII, 68: ". . . There is a great difference between 
false suppositions . . . and the true ideas born within me, the first and principal of 
which is that of God. For really I discern in many ways-that this idea is not something 
factitious, and depending solely on my thought, but that it is the image of a true and 
immutable nature; first of all, because I cannot conceive anything but God himself to 
whose essence [existence] necessarily pertains...." Here we see Descartes telling us 
that the distinctiveness of the idea of God shows that God exists. Notice also that he 
states his view in terms of an idea's being an image of something. This shows his inter- 
est in seeing the proof in idea-thing terms. 
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I grant the difference Descartes emphasizes between the God case and 
the others, but I deny that the difference makes a difference to the objec- 
tion in question. As I see it, the idea-thing distinction cuts across the 
essence-existence distinction. Even if the idea of God is sui generis in 
being the one and only conception involving existence necessarily, this 
is a fact about the idea and conception themselves. To be sure, it is a dis- 
tinctive fact. But, as such, it permits no inference about the nature of 
things outside the mind. In the end, this is the point of the objection. 
In short, Descartes believes that the difference he emphasizes between 
the God case and all others is decisive and so he believes that the objec- 
tor has been disarmed. He believes, correctly, that he has shown a dif- 
ference between the God case and all others. But he overlooks the dis- 
tinction between ideas and things and the doubts he has raised by 
means of that distinction. Those doubts still apply to the God case, 
notwithstanding the special feature of that case. The objection stands, 
as I see it. Why does Descartes fail to see this point? 
What I have suggested thus far is that he fails to see the force of the 
objection because he focuses on the essence-existence distinction when 
the objection turns on the idea-thing distinction. Two other considera- 
tions come to mind. One is that Descartes does not develop his view of 
essential truth in light of the idea-thing distinction. The other is that 
Descartes tends to presume a kind of correspondence between ideas and 
things which is generally innocuous given his program but is problem- 
atic in the God case. 
When I say that Descartes does not develop his view of essential 
truth, what I have in mind is this. In the passages we have considered, 
he quite unself-consciously talks of the essence of God and the essence 
of triangles. What is not specified is whether the essences of which he 
speaks are those ideas which are in our mind, some other kind of thing 
outside our mind, or both. But that he means at least something in our 
mind is, I think, clear from those passages. He says: "I clearly see that 
existence can no more be separated from the essence of God than can its 
having its three angles equal to two right angles be separated from the 
essence of a (rectilinear) triangle, or the idea of a mountain from the 
idea of a valley." (HR, i 8 i; AT, VII, 66.) I presume that the three cases 
are intended to be viewed on a par and hence the transition froin talk of 
separation of essences to separation of ideas establishes that Descartes' 
views about essences are at the same time views about ideas. This being 
the case, when Descartes tells us that existence is a necessary part of the 
essence of God, we may take him to be telling us that the idea of exis- 
tence is such a part of the idea of God. And while this may be so, that 
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fact alone does not determine anything about the nature of God as an 
object, thing, or item outside the mind. In order to make such a connec- 
tion, Descartes would have to develop his views on essential truths in 
light of the idea-thing distinction.7 
What Descartes says about the mountain-valley case illustrates what 
I call an innocuous presumption about the correspondence between 
ideas and things. He presumes a correspondence between necessarily 
connected ideas and the corresponding things if there are such things. 
To presume that much is not to presume that there are any things. The 
presumption yields essential truths without yielding existential truths. 
In the case of God, the idea of existence is necessarily connected with 
the remainder of the idea of God and Descartes seems to conclude from 
this that the essence-existence distinction is obliterated. He seems to 
conclude further that he may assert a correspondence between the theo- 
logical idea and things. By making the innocuous presumption he may 
grant the objection in a general way by pointing out the essence-exis- 
tence distinction. But by also dwelling on the special features of the God 
case and what looks like the obliteration of that distinction, he may 
deny the objection applies in the God case. This is, for the reasons I 
have given earlier, a mistake. Once one invokes the contrast between 
ideas and things, it is always relevant for a Cartesian to ask: how does 
one know that things exist in conformity to ideas and conceptions? 
Descartes is not so single-minded iii dismissing the objection as my 
discussion thus far suggests. He goes still further in accepting the objec- 
tion when he says in one of the passages cited earlier: 
While from the fact that I cannot conceive God without existence, it follows that existence 
is inseparable from Him, and hence that He really exists; not that my thought can bring 
this to pass, or impose any necessity on things, but, on the contrary, because the necessity 
which lies in the thing itself, i.e., the necessity of the existence of God determines me to 
think in this way. (HR, i8i; AT, VII, 67.) 
One point, again and in effect, is that facts about ideas do not determine 
facts about things. But rather than denying that there is any correspon- 
dence between ideas and things, Descartes maintains that there is such a 
correspondence: in some way, the very basis of the specialness of the 
idea of God is determined by the necessity of the existence of God. The 
7I assume that Descartes does not avail himself of Malebranche's commitment to seeing 
things in God. And I see no reason to maintain that Descartes believes we see God's 
nature itself as opposed to a representation, in the mind, of that nature. Alan 
Gewirth's effort in this area bears study. See his "The Cartesian Circle Revisited", 
Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 67 (October 5, 1970), pp. 35-57. See also Harry Frank- 
furt, "Descartes on the Creation of the Eternal Truths", The Philosophical Review, 
Vol. 86 (January, 1977), pp. 36-57. 
DESCARTES ON THEOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE Z09 
correspondence is between ideas and things but directionally, as it were, 
the determination is in the direction from the thing to the idea. This 
claim supports my attribution of a presumed correspondence. It also 
shows that Descartes may be prepared to accept the objection to his 
theological proof after all. 
He concedes that his thought cannot "bring to pass" the existence of 
God or "impose any necessity on things" and I take these to be ways of 
granting the import of the objection. 
At the same time, the remarks we are now considering turn us in 
another direction. If their upshot is that it is not that God exists because 
I think, and think necessarily, of Him as existing, but, rather, that I 
think of Him as existing because He necessarily exists, then we are con- 
fronted anew with the question of how do I know that He exists and 
exists necessarily? Descartes must establish independently of the discus- 
sion we have considered that God exists. The only other attempts in this 
direction occur in the third meditation and hence it will be appropriate 
if we turn our attention there. 
II. The Third Meditation Proof 
The third meditation proof is complex and complicated. But I think that 
its gist may be captured relatively easily. Imagine an inventory of two 
sorts of things, ideas on the one hand and things outside the mind on 
the other. Imagine, also, arranging the items on each list according to 
the perfection, putting the most perfect things and the ideas of the most 
perfect things at the top of the respective lists. The notion of perfection 
is never spelled out by Descartes, but one gathers that it has to do with 
"nearness to God" in nature: men are more like God because they 
share more of his characteristics than other things such as horses do; 
then again, horses are more like God than stones are, etc.8 A thing's 
place on the list of things is a function of how closely the thing's nature 
resembles the nature of God whereas the place on its list for an idea is a 
function of the place of the thing the idea purports to represent on the 
list of things. Our two lists will in fact be very similar, although it is very 
important to emphasize that the one is a list of ideas and the other is a 
list of things. 
8 HR, i6i-66; AT, VII, 40-46. 
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Ideas Things 
God God 
angels angels 
man man 
plants plants 
stones stones 
It is also important to emphasize that one may draw up such lists hypo- 
thetically. That is, one need not know of the existence of such things in 
order to list them. This is precisely Descartes' situation in the third 
meditation where he has denied knowledge of things and yet neverthe- 
less wants to talk about hierarchies of things and correlative hierarchies 
of ideas. 
The third meditation leaves no doubt that Descartes sees the proof of 
the existence and goodness of God in idea-thing terms. That is, he 
makes it clear that what he hopes to do, and what he thinks he succeeds 
in doing, is to demonstrate a correspondence between the idea of God 
and an item, God Himself, outside his mind. The crucial moves then are 
determined by the ways in which Descartes establishes connections 
between ideas and things generally and between the idea of God and 
God Himself in particular. 
Descartes proceeds by presenting certain causal principles and dis- 
coveries about ideas.9 The combination of the two enable him to argue 
that God exists. The causal principles are that every idea has a cause 
and that every idea ultimately has a cause which has at least as much 
formal reality as the idea has objective reality. In terms of our lists, the 
second principle becomes: every idea must ultimately be caused by a 
thing at least as high on the list of things as the thing the idea purports 
to be about. For later purposes, it is worth restating the claims as condi- 
tionals: if there are ideas, they have causes, and if there are ideas and if 
they have causes, then their causes are things at least as high on the list 
of things as what a given idea purports to be about. 
Another important element in the third meditation proof has to do 
with the existence and nature of ideas. One gathers that Descartes 
introspects, or discovers with his mind's eye, items which he categorizes 
as ideas. Among ideas, he draws distinctions on the basis of their repre- 
sentational character: ideas purport to represent different kinds of 
things, things varying in perfection. Those ideas purportedly represent- 
ing the least perfect things are those which represent mere material 
things. In between, as on our list, are ideas of things intermediate 
9 Ibid. 
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between mere material things and God. Of course the idea which pur- 
ports to represent the most perfect thing is the idea of God. 
The proof of the existence of God goes as follows. Having discovered 
items which he categorizes as ideas, and having ranked them according 
to what they purportedly represent, he invokes the causal principles. So 
doing, he is in a position to proclaim that the idea of God must be 
caused by something and, more specifically, it must be caused by some- 
thing at least as perfect as what the idea purportedly represents, namely 
God Himself. In other words, the only thing capable of causing the idea 
of God is God Himself. 
The gist of the argument is thus quite simple: Descartes discovers 
specific ideas in himself, applies causal principles to the ideas, and infers 
that God must exist as cause of the idea of God. As I see it, the difficulty 
with the argument is the acceptance of both the causal principles and 
the implications of their application. As far as I can tell, the earlier 
doubts apply to the use of the causal principles and the implications of 
that use. At the least, Descartes does not show us how he overcomes his 
earlier doubts. In effect, he presumes he overcomes them. In order to 
make my case, I shall rehearse his earlier doubts and then comment on 
their applicability to the third meditation proof. 
In the first meditation, Descartes doubts mathematical truths even 
though they "contain come measure of certainty and an element of the 
indubitable" and even though "it does not seem possible that truths so 
clear and apparent can be suspected of any falsity." (HR, 147; AT, VII, 
zo.) The mechanism of doubt is the demon possibility, the possibility 
that mathematical claims are as just described but nonetheless false as 
well as the more general possibility that he has all his ideas and judg- 
ments without there being any corresponding mind-independent objects 
at all. Doubt of claims like mathematical ones in their compelling char- 
acter occurs in the second meditation. 
In the wax example Descartes maintains that he may have a clear and 
distinct perception of the wax which is false. This emerges when he 
announces having arrived at a clear and distinct perception (HR, 155; 
AT, VII, 31) of the wax but then reminds us of the previous doubts 
about bodies. In context, he takes the important point to be that even if 
false a clear and distinct perception establishes the existence of himself 
as a thinking thing. For my purposes, the important point is the possi- 
bility of a false clear and distinct perception. Descartes returns to this 
point at the outset of the third meditation.'0 
? I discuss this doubt in "The Importance of Descartes' Wax Example", Ratio, Vol. 
XXI, No. i, pp. 73-84. For the third meditation doubt, see HR, 158-59 and AT, VII, 
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He begins the third meditation by pointing out that if he establishes a 
truth in the second meditation, as he thinks he does, then he ought to be 
able to extract some sort of standard of truth which, it is hoped, he can 
use elsewhere to expand his knowledge. He introduces clear and dis- 
tinct perception in this regard. But as soon as he introduces the stan- 
dard, he raises serious questions about it. He reminds us of the demon 
possibility: 
But when I took anything very simple and easy in the sphere of arithmetic or geometry 
into consideration, e.g., that two and three together made five, and other things of the 
sort, were not these present to my mind so clearly as to enable me to affirm that they were 
true? Certainly if I judged that since such matters could be doubted, this would not have 
been so for any other reason than that it came into my mind that perhaps a God might 
have endowed me with such a nature that I may have been deceived even concerning 
things which seemed to me most manifest . . . . I am constrained to confess that it is 
easy to Him, if He wishes it, to cause me to err, even in matters in which I believe myself 
to have the best evidence. (HR, 158-59; AT, VII, 35-36.) 
I take Descartes' thought to be: mathematical truths "pass" the cri- 
terion of truth by being matters of clear and distinct perception. But the 
demon possibility led him to conclude that even matters which seem 
"most manifest", matters involving "the best evidence" and mathemat- 
ical truths may be doubted. Thus at least some clear and distinct percep- 
tions are once more rendered doubtful. 
This position is awkward. Doubting matters that are "most mani- 
fest" or that involve "the best evidence" naturally raises the question of 
what would or could count as a certainty. Indeed, one wonders about 
the conviction that attends such matters. Descartes shares this wonder, 
for he responds to the doubt of the last passage by moving a kind of 
indubitability to the fore: 
And, on the other hand, always when I direct my attention to things which I believe 
myself to perceive very clearly, Iam so persuaded of their truth that I let myself break out 
into words such as these: Let who will deceive me, He can never cause me to be nothing 
while I think that I am, or some day cause it to be true to say that I have never been, it 
being true now to say that I am, or that two and three make more or less than five, or any 
such thing in which I see a manifest contradiction. (HR, 158-59; AT, VII, 36.) 
Descartes thus tells us that the degree of conviction which attends such 
matters, matters which he now tells us are such that their denials 
involve manifest contradictions, is great enough that he is tempted to 
cast the demon aside and maintain the indubitability of the kind of 
claims in question. But, he reminds us in the sequel to the above pas- 
sage, there is the earlier demon-inspired doubt. The only way to elimi- 
nate this doubt is to prove the existence of a good God. 
35-36. 
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The awkwardness of Descartes' position remains: he has doubted 
claims that are "most manifest," that involve "the best evidence," 
claims whose denials involve "manifest contradictions," and which, 
nonetheless, have some sort of indubitability associated with them. The 
doubt that he raises is based on the possibility that in some way he may 
be wrong about compelling thoughts. This is one possibility that the 
demon represents. How does Descartes respond to this conundrum? 
Initially he sharpens the nature of his position: he knows of ideas in 
his mind and various attendant attitudes (HR, I58-59; AT, VII, 37). 
The immunity to error here seems based on some sort of direct, nonrep- 
resentational awareness of the content of his mind. He wonders about 
knowledge of things outside him. Are there any ideas, and if so, which 
represent such things? He rejects several factors which cause him to 
believe in things outside him on the grounds that they are not respon- 
sive to the earlier doubts. Next he introduces both a causal principle 
and a means of knowing its truth: "Now it is manifest by the natural 
light that there must be at least as much reality in the efficient and total 
cause as in its, effect" (HR, i6z; AT, VII, 40). What is the natural light? 
Does it enable Descartes to navigate around his earlier doubts? 
Descartes says astonishingly little about the natural light. We need an 
explanation of how the natural light validates the causal principle, of 
how he may overcome the earlier objection that a demon may have cre- 
ated him with just such principles that he accepts as true but are in fact 
false. To point out that the causal principle, as well as the more specific 
forms of it which are used in the theological proof, are compelling 
thoughts is insufficient. Just such thoughts were doubted earlier. We 
need some reason for supposing that the causal principles are more than 
compelling thoughts. Apparently Descartes believes that introducing 
the natural light is helpful here. I fail to see how this is so. 
He does, in the third meditation, suggest that the natural light is a 
form of clear and distinct perception or else a catalyst for arriving at 
clear and distinct perception." For example, he tells us that the natural 
In the Principles Descartes explains that God is not the cause of our errors and then 
says: "And consequently all that we perceive clearly is true, and this delivers us from 
the doubts put forward above. 
Whence it follows that the light of nature, or the faculty of knowledge which God 
has given us, can never disclose to us any object which is not true, inasmuch as it com- 
prehends it, that is, inasmuch as it apprehends it clearly and distinctly. (HR, Z3i; AT, 
IX, 38.)" Here also Descartes appears to assimilate the natural light and clear and dis- 
tinct perception. In another place, he tells us that: ". . . In the case of our clearest and 
most accurate judgements which, if false, could not be corrected by any that are 
clearer, or by any other natural faculty, I clearly affirm that we cannot be deceived. 
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light causes him to "know clearly" that ideas are representations which 
may be subsumed under general causal principles: 
And although it may be the case that one idea gives birth to another idea, that cannot con- 
tinue to be so indefinitely; for in the end we must reach an idea whose cause shall be so to 
speak an archetype, in which the whole reality [or perfection] which is so to speak objec- 
tively [or by representation] in these ideas is contained formally [and really]. Thus the 
light of nature causes me to know clearly that the ideas in me are like [pictures or] images 
which can, in truth, easily fall short of the perfection of the objects from which they have 
been derived, but which can never contain anything greater or more perfect. 
And the longer and the more carefully that I investigate these matters, the more clearly 
and distinctly do I recognize their truth. (HR, i63; AT, VII, 4z.) 
In other places, clarity and distinctness itself seems to carry the day: 
And we cannot say that this idea of God is perhaps materially false . . . for . . as 
this idea is very clear and distinct and contains within it more objective reality than any 
other, there can be none which is of itself more true, nor any in which there can be less 
suspicion of falsehood. The idea, I say, of this Being who is absolutely perfect and infinite, 
is entirely true. . . . This idea is also very clear and distinct; since all that I conceive 
clearly and distinctly of the real and the true, and of what conveys some perfection, is in 
its entirety contained in this idea. (HR, i66; AT, VII, 46.) 
Indeed, the third meditation proof is replete with appeals to clarity and 
distinctness, and relatively few appeals to the natural light, once the 
natural light is introduced. But appeal to clarity and distinctness is not 
by itself helpful because such appeals were doubted earlier. Some addi- 
tional factor must be introduced and explained if we are to see how 
clarity and distinctness may be employed after all.'2 
For, since God is the highest being He cannot be otherwise than the highest good and 
highest truth, and hence it is contradictory that anything should proceed from Him 
that positively tends towards falsity. (HR, II, 40-41; AT, IX, II3.)" Here Descartes 
does not assimilate the natural light and clear and distinct perception. Rather, what he 
tells us is that clear and distinct perception is the best (natural) faculty of knowledge 
that we have available. Presumably the natural light is no better than it. 
Descartes recognizes this in several ways. One way is to tell us how trustworthy our 
clear and distinct perceptions are provided we have knowledge of the existence of a 
good God. He says of the atheist: "That an atheist can know clearly that the three 
angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, I do not deny, I merely affirm that, on 
the other hand, such knowledge on his part cannot constitute true science, because no 
knowledge that can be rendered doubtful should be called science. Since he is, as sup- 
posed, an Atheist, he cannot be sure that he is not deceived in the things that seem most 
evident to him, as has been sufficiently shown; and though perchance the doubt does 
not occur to him, nevertheless it may come up, if he examine the matter, or if another 
suggests it; he can never be safe from it unless he first recognizes the existence of a 
God. (HR, II, 39; AT, IX, iii.)" 
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In sum, the third meditation introduces and employs a general causal 
framework. Descartes does not tell us why this framework has immu- 
nity to the earlier doubts about even claims which he found compelling. 
In other words, he does not tell us how the grounds for accepting the 
causal framework are better than the grounds for accepting claims he 
has doubted. Nor is it obvious that this is so. It is obvious that the cau- 
sal framework, if accepted and applied to the idea of God, implies a 
relation between the idea of God in the mind and God, an item or thing 
outside the mind. Yet earlier Descartes doubted the correspondence of 
ideas to things outside the mind. He does not explain why this implied 
relation is above those earlier doubts. In the absence of such explana- 
tions I conclude that Descartes presumes that his causal framework and 
its implications overcome the earlier doubts. But he does not make it 
clear why he should presume this. This is one form of question-begging. 
Further, if the natural light is a form of clear and distinct perception (or 
even merely a catalyst to induce such perception as a decisive part of the 
proof), then I believe Arnauld's specific charge is sustained: clear and 
distinct perception is employed in the process which also is alleged to 
validate just such perception. 
If what I have been saying is correct, it is pertinent to ask: why does 
Descartes not see that his argument fails? Or, to ask the same thing dif- 
ferently, why does Descartes not respond to the serious earlier doubts? 
My answer here is similar to the one I gave about the fifth meditation 
proof. Descartes dwells on presumptions he does not make and so over- 
looks the ones he does make. 
The earlier doubts are essentially two: doubt about accepting claims 
which appear intellectually compelling, doubt about the correspon- 
dence of ideas to things. Descartes is more responsive to the idea-thing 
doubt. He goes to great lengths to introduce this issue and show that, 
consistent with the points of earlier meditations, many of his ideas may 
fail to represent things outside himself and that he may himself be the 
cause of them. 
Descartes insists in the third meditation that there are many ideas 
which do not require the kinds of thing they purport to represent for 
their causes.'3 As a thinking thing, Descartes may cause the ideas of 
stones, dogs, chairs, trees, and fish. He is a thing at least as perfect as 
these things, indeed, he could be the cause of a majority of his ideas. He 
calls attention to this fact in the meditation as if to reassure the reader 
(and himself?) that he does not commit "the principal error and com- 
monest which we may meet with in them [ideas] . . . my judging that 
13 HR, i64-65; AT, VII, 43-44. 
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the ideas which are in me are similar or conformable to the things which 
are outside me." (HR, i 6o; AT, VII, 37.) There is a solid core of truth 
to this position: there are many correspondences which he does not take 
for granted. To dwell on these is to focus on the doubts about idea- 
thing correspondence, to highlight cases in which such correspondence 
is not taken for granted. 
When Descartes offers his conclusion that God exists, we may ask 
why this idea-thing correspondence is not subject to the earlier doubts. 
No doubt Descartes thinks that he validly deduces the conclusion and 
so, for this reason, the earlier doubt is answered. Here it would be per- 
tinent to ask about the introduction of the causal premises which lead 
to the conclusion, to ask about the soundness of the argument. There 
are several reasons the introduction of the premises might seem innocu- 
ous. 
One is that, as in the fifth meditation, I believe that Descartes sees the 
causal principles as expressive of necessary connections among ideas: 
he is compelled to think causally in certain ways, the causal principles 
express essential truths. Descartes never questions the knowledge he has 
of his own ideas. So the causal framework may appear indubitable, just 
as other essential claims are indubitable. 
The introduction of the causal principles may look safe to Descartes 
for another reason. They may be understood as conditional in charac- 
ter: if there are ideas, they have causes; if there are ideas and if they 
have causes, then their ultimate causes have at least as much formal 
reality as the ideas have objective reality. The principles may be under- 
stood as not requiring the existence of any things, or even ideas (other 
than the ones required for Descartes' causal thoughts), much less idea- 
thing correspondence. So viewed the causal principles are again like the 
essential truths of the fifth meditation: conditional truths based on nec- 
essary connections known to obtain among ideas. So viewing the prin- 
ciples enables Descartes to avoid presuming idea-thing correspondence 
in introducing the principles. Thus Descartes may see himself as avoid- 
ing that particular doubt. 
Descartes, by focusing on the idea-thing correspondence issue and 
doubt, neglects to tell us why the causal principles may be seen as more 
than mere expressions of how he thinks. That is, he neglects the other 
doubt associated with the demon, the possibility that the causal princi- 
ples are merely demonic implants. In turn, he neglects to provide an 
adequate justification for viewing the causal principles as more than 
such implants. 
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I have pointed out several reasons Descartes may not see the prob- 
lems with his third meditation procedure. One is that he focuses on the 
idea-thing correspondence issue and moves to the fore the presumptions 
he does not make here. The others have to do with the seeming safety of 
introducing and employing the causal principles. Because they are con- 
ditional in character, they too appear to avoid idea-thing presumptions. 
And because they express necessary connections among ideas, they are 
indubitable by that very standard. 
III. Summary: Parallels Between the Fifth and Third Meditations 
I think it is fair to say that the third meditation is structured around the 
issue of whether we can know that any ideas represent things and the 
effort to prove that the idea of God is "similar or conformable to" a 
mind-independent God. The objection from the fifth meditation, with 
its question of whether necessarily connected ideas represent things, 
raises the same issues. Thus although the proofs, e.g., the premises, dif- 
fer, the general concerns are the same. 
In both meditations, Descartes indicates that facts about our thinking 
do not suffice to determine facts about things outside our mind or, more 
accurately, knowledge of facts about thought does not suffice for 
knowledge of facts about things. In the fifth meditation he denies that 
his thought imposes any necessity on things; in the third he mentions 
that "The principal error and commonest which we may meet with in 
them [ideas], consists in my judging that the ideas which are in me are 
similar or conformable to the things which are outside me." 
In both meditations, the idea of God is held to be special. Its special- 
ness is different in the two cases: in the one it is the necessary inclusion 
of the idea of existence which is taken to be significant, while in the 
other it is the representation of something more perfect than himself 
which is the decisive factor. The former difference allegedly undermines 
the distinction between essential and existential truths, while the latter 
difference allegedly entitles Descartes to conclude that the cause of the 
idea of God had to be God Himself. 
Such differences notwithstanding, Descartes' own point from several 
places in the meditations that one may not infer facts about things from 
facts about thoughts remains. Descartes recognizes the need for what 
might be called a bridging principle, a principle spelling out the connec- 
tion(s) between such facts in both proofs. To that extent he continually 
adheres to his own point. In the fifth meditation he believes the connec- 
tion can be made when one realizes that the idea of God is such a special 
case that the contrast between essential and existential claims breaks 
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down. In the third meditation the causal principles are bridging princi- 
ples. 
I maintain that in spite of Descartes' responsiveness to his earlier 
doubt, in particular the idea-thing correspondence doubt, he never fully 
overcomes that doubt. Rather what he does is to emphasize the errors 
he does not make: he does not take many idea-thing correspondences 
for granted, the causal principles (like the essential truths of the fifth 
meditation) do not make existential commitments, etc. By presenting an 
array of cases in which his earlier objections are not applicable he can 
convince himself and some others that he meets such objections. I 
believe that he wrestles with them without defeating them.'4 
14 I am grateful to G. Georgacarakos, R. Gibson, D. Huff, P. Markie, and a referee of this 
journal for helping me to rethink points of this paper. 
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